![]() ![]() ![]() But alongside this divine-necessitation understanding, natural scientists and philosophers as different as Roger Bacon (c. Even as late as the Enlightenment age, philosophers such as Montesquieu (1689 –1755) attributed the order of nature to the hand of God. The mathematician and philosopher Ren é Descartes (1596 –1650), in particular, explicitly related his law of inertia to the sustaining power of God. This notion is clearly associated with the prescribing force various laws ( lex, regula ) possess due to their origin in God's will -be they the natural laws of moral conduct or the laws of mechanics. ![]() The ancestors of this concept, however, are old and include the ideas of social, legal, and moral order, which themselves can be traced to the notion of divine legislation. Most historians agree that the concept of scientific law as it is used today did not become widely accepted until the scientific revolution marking the birth of modern science. The question of whether laws describe or prescribe the course of nature has always been given particular emphasis in the debates. Finally, it is a matter of controversy how the laws of various disciplines are related to each other.ĭo laws describe or prescribe? Some historical background It is also unclear whether any single theory could do justice to the diverse kinds of laws used in different scientific disciplines (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.). But are the laws of nature real? Do they belong to the world or do they rather reflect the way people speak about it? Do they merely describe the facts and processes in nature or do they govern them? In other words, do laws possess a modal force, the force of nomological necessity, not attaching to merely contingent facts? And if they do, how does one get a handle on this important distinction between laws and nonlawful accidental generalizations? These questions continue to be widely debated and there is no generally accepted philosophical theory of the laws of nature. Statements of the laws of nature provide the most systematic and unified account of phenomena they are used to make predictions, and they figure centrally in explanation. This thesis will conclude that adopting the metaphysics of powers in a limited sphere of investigation can lead to a stronger Humean metaphysics of character and eliminate contradictions from Humean philosophy as a whole.It is generally held that the search for laws is part and parcel of natural science. It is argued that this reconceptualization can be achieved without contravening Humean epistemology in any significant way, and that it can be done while maintaining the basic Humean principle that all ideas must precede from a corresponding impression. Specifically, character traits such as virtues and vices should be understood as tending towards an outcome, rather than adhering to a standard stimulus-response dispositional model. The solution offered is that, to be understood coherently, Humean metaphysics should incorporate aspects of powers-based ontologies to replace summative models. Humean empiricism leads directly to a bundle conception of the self, one that is comprised entirely of observable impressions and ideas, yet it is unclear how this conception is related to durable character traits, which are an integral part of Humean ethics. A key point of contrast, between Hume’s bundle theory of the self and his commitment to long-term durable character traits, is analysed, to exemplify the difficulties. The tension is identified as being due to the strict Humean empiricist epistemology, which severely limits the scope of ethical investigation. The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse the tension between Humean epistemology and Humean ethics. ![]()
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